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This collection of essays had its origin in a conference that was held at 
the University of Cape Town in July 2007 to pay tribute to the constitutional 
jurisprudence of Laurie Ackermann. It contains the papers delivered at the 
conference, together with the Ben Beinart Memorial Lecture delivered by 
Jeremy Waldron a day earlier. Exploring, celebrating and critiquing key aspects 
of Justice Ackermann’s contribution to the development of the Constitutional 
Court’s jurisprudence, the volume manages to transcend the strictures of both 
the Festschrift and conference proceedings format and becomes an extensive 
reflection on the transformative potential of South Africa’s Constitution and 
of constitutionalism in general.
The contributions are varied and draw on a rich diversity of theoretical 
perspectives. It is, nevertheless, possible to identify a number of themes 
running across the various essays. Not surprisingly, given Ackermann J’s 
pioneering work in these areas, human dignity and freedom loom particularly 
large. But dignity and freedom are complex and contested ideas which evoke 
a range of other ideas, tensions and aporias. Dignity calls to mind the tension 
between the universal and the particular, and between the absolute respect 
which is due every human being and the inevitability of limitations on the right 
to dignity. Freedom refers to negative and positive freedom, revolutionary 
freedom, subjective freedom and relational freedom. Moreover, mention of 
both dignity and freedom raises questions about their relationship to equality, 
difference and socio-economic justice.
These issues are all explored in this volume. While the tone of the discussion 
is, at times, unabashedly philosophical, the various contributors’ analyses 
remain situated within two contexts, which are both evoked by the book’s 
title. On the one hand, the explorations of dignity, freedom and related ideas 
are framed by the authors’ understanding – and, at times, critical examination 
– of what it means to live and write in a post-apartheid legal order. On the other 
hand, most of the essays focus specifically on the context of constitutional 
adjudication, and explore the possibilities and limits of adjudicative strategies 
in helping to facilitate the transformation of the ways in which law undergirds 
and structures social power.
While I cannot hope to do justice to the individual contributions within 
the confines of this review, I will allude to some of the debates opened 
up in the volume by picking at a few of the themes identified above. It is 
perhaps fitting to start with the views expressed on the nature of South 
Africa’s constitutional revolution (some authors insist that it is precisely that, 
despite the lack of a rupture in the chain of legality) and the meaning of the 
designation “post-apartheid” legal order. For Roger Berkowitz (“Revolutionary 
       
Constitutionalism: Some Thoughts on Laurie Ackermann’s Jurisprudence”), 
Ackermann J’s judgment in Ferreira v Levin NO 1996 2 SA 621 (CC) marks 
a return to the origins of the new constitutional order. Drawing on Hannah 
Arendt’s work on revolution, he argues that Ackermann is here involved in the 
revolutionary activity of debating the meaning of and re-enacting the founding 
experience of the nation. On this analysis, the constitutional revolution 
created spaces of political freedom in which the uncertainty and excitement of 
revolutionary political action can be re-enacted. AJ Barnard-Naudé (“Beyond 
the Brother: Radical Freedom”) also invokes Arendt’s political thought in his 
characterization of the post-apartheid order as a post-totalitarian legal order 
in need of a radical understanding of freedom. Criticizing the subjectivism of 
the negative understanding of freedom enunciated in Ackermann’s judgment 
in Ferreira, he draws on the work of Jean-Luc Nancy and others to articulate 
freedom with relation. Whereas apartheid rested upon the elimination of 
the spacing between the self and the other and thus branded difference as a 
mark of inferiority, the post-apartheid legal order promises a radical freedom 
which secures a space of sharing in which human beings can appear in their 
incommensurability and singularity.
This vision of a democracy to come has some affinity with Drucilla Cornell’s 
take on the nature of South Africa’s constitutional revolution (“Bridging the 
Span toward Justice: Laurie Ackermann and the Ongoing Architectonic of 
Dignity Jurisprudence”). Cornell argues that the Constitution, by grounding 
legality in an ideal community or a Kantian kingdom of ends, appeals to an 
ethical realm which exists only as an aspirational ideal. Unlike, for instance, 
HLA Hart’s rule of recognition which grounds the legal system in a social 
fact, the Constitution points beyond the sheer facticity of social life to an 
ethical humanity. On this view, Ackermann J’s recognition in Ferreira of a 
residual right of freedom points towards an ethical future which cannot be 
fully captured in the categories and taxonomies of the law as it is.
A number of authors defend the idea of human dignity against the charge that 
it is too individualistic to respond to structural and group-based disadvantage. 
Allen Wood (“Human Dignity, Right and the Realm of Ends”) argues, on the 
basis of his analysis of Kantian moral philosophy, that dignity is a radically 
egalitarian ideal which subverts any cultural traditions or social institutions 
that instrumentalise human beings or treat some individuals as inferior. He is 
particularly critical of the market economy, which legitimizes vast inequality 
and narrowly self-interested behaviour in the name of freedom and the rational 
pursuit of self-interest. For Wood, as for Cornell, the dignity of the individual 
can only be thought within the context of a community of shared ends. 
Peggy Cooper-Davis (“Toward a Relational Constitutionalism”) similarly 
links dignity to a relational jurisprudence which resists the privileging of the 
perspectives of the powerful and affluent, and facilitates new constitutional 
imaginations through a reactive constitutionalism which is attentive to those 
voices which, historically, have been inhibited, subordinated or silenced.
In this respect Dennis Davis (“Judge Ackermann and the Jurisprudence of 
Mourning”) is the sole dissenting voice. In Davis’ view dignity, as employed 
by the Constitutional Court, is individualistic at the core. The primacy 
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accorded to dignity springs from the same ideological source as Ackermann 
J’s insistence, in Ferreira, on a negative understanding of freedom as well as 
the Court’s failure, in cases concerning the horizontal application of the Bill of 
Rights, to come to terms with relations of social power. For Davis, this signals 
a yearning for a return to the individualistic common law narrative that was 
shattered by apartheid and a consequent failure to construct a new story that 
can live up to the demands of the post-apartheid constitutional order.
Judge Ackermann’s construction in Ferreira of a residual right to 
freedom elicits a diversity of responses, as should already be evident from 
the foregoing. Francois du Bois (“Freedom and the Dignity of Citizens”) 
notes that Ackermann J derives this right not from Kant’s notion of moral 
dignity but from his legal theory. Unlike the former, which does not support 
a strong version of moral self-determination, the latter is better equipped to 
ground a right of general freedom. Whereas Kant’s moral writings conceive 
of individuals in abstract, impersonal terms and demand respect only for 
their moral capacity, his legal writings are concerned with the respect due 
to concrete, socially embedded persons. Du Bois distinguishes, accordingly, 
between the abstract dignity of humanity and the dignity of citizens. The 
dignity of citizens is a relational concept which presupposes a shared realm of 
meaning. The negative freedom that Judge Ackermann derived from it is, in 
the author’s opinion, itself intermeshed with social practices and is therefore 
not irreconcilable with positive freedom.
Anton Fagan (“Dignity and the Political Right to Freedom”) has different 
ideas about the basis of a general right of freedom. For him, neither the interest 
protected by the right to freedom nor the duty imposed by it upon the state 
is best explained in dignitarian terms. Fagan concludes that, since autonomy 
and not dignity provides the most cogent explanation of the right to freedom, 
freedom is best conceived not only in negative but also in positive terms.
Sandra Liebenberg (“The Value of Freedom in Interpreting Socio-Economic 
Rights”) explores the meaning of freedom from a socio-economic rights 
perspective. Drawing on the relational feminism of Jennifer Nedelsky and the 
capabilities approach of Amartya Sen, she argues for a richer understanding 
of freedom which recognises that freedom depends in part on a network of 
social relations and material conditions. This understanding is attentive to the 
ways in which “private” relations are structured and enforced by the power of 
the state. It interrogates the implications of state measures for the capability 
of those affected to become autonomous, and asks whether and to what extent 
it respects and promotes their agency and active participation. In Liebenberg’s 
view, the tension between positive and negative freedom must be upheld and 
used creatively, rather than simply abandoning the former in favour of the 
latter.
Frank Michelman (“Freedom by Any Other Name? A Comparative Note 
on Losing Battles While Winning Wars”) asks, with reference to the views 
expressed elsewhere by Bishop and Woolman, whether Ackermann J’s 
construction of a residual right to freedom did not, despite its formal rejection 
by the majority in Ferreira, prevail in the end in the form of the Court’s dignity 
and privacy jurisprudence. Michelman develops a number of distinctions in 
360 STELL LR 2010 2
       
the course of a careful and nuanced reading of that jurisprudence: between 
the recognition of a right to freedom that extends to all human activities, 
no matter how trivial, or only those unenumerated freedoms deemed to be 
“fundamental”; between informational and decisional privacy; and between 
a quasi-delictual and libertarian construction of privacy. This leads him to 
conclude that, while fundamental aspects of freedom that are not enumerated 
in the constitutional text are indeed protected under the rubric of dignity and 
privacy, this still falls short of the residual freedom, unrestricted in scope, that 
Ackermann J asserted in Ferreira.
The ideas of dignity and freedom also call forth questions of identity and 
difference. These questions acquire a particular relevance and urgency in a 
society like South Africa, in which the traces of past patterns of discrimination 
are still all too visible. For instance, is it a legitimate strategy to valorise 
identities that have been oppressed, sidelined or branded inferior in the past? 
Or does that risk a return to the essentialism and conformism that lie at the 
root of past discrimination? In his essay, Jeremy Waldron (“The Dignity of 
Groups”) examines the feasibility of notions of group dignity. Waldron takes 
seriously the proposition that, since there is a collective dimension to prejudice, 
such prejudice can only be countered effectively through a commitment to 
the equal dignity of groups. He clearly has something more affirmative in 
mind than what he terms Hugo-dignity, named after a Constitutional Court 
judgment (President of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo 1997 4 SA 1 
(CC)) in which the Court defined equality in terms of the equal respect due 
to persons regardless of their membership of a particular group. At the same 
time, he is worried that the recognition of group dignity may re-introduce 
forms of hierarchy and subordination (for example, of women) that are 
inconsistent with the dignity of the individual. Waldron concludes with a plea 
for the affirmation of group dignity without identity, that is an understanding 
of group dignity that is uninformed by assumptions of homogeneity and 
unity. (Perhaps this can be labelled Pillay-dignity after the judgment in MEC 
for Education: KwaZulu-Natal v Pillay 2008 1 SA 474 (CC). In this case 
the Constitutional Court recognised the expressive and constitutive value 
of group membership, yet resisted the idea that cultures are monolithic and 
accorded cultural and religious practices that are voluntary the same measure 
of protection as those that are mandatory.)
Pierre de Vos argues in his essay (“From Heteronormativity to Full 
Sexual Citizenship? Equality and Sexual Freedom in Laurie Ackermann’s 
Constitutional Jurisprudence”) that sexual liberation cannot be achieved 
simply through the legal inclusion of sexual minorities without challenging 
the underlying power relations that normalise heterosexual desire, brand other 
forms of desire as deviant and privilege heterosexual institutions such as 
marriage. Inclusive strategies end up restricting societal acceptance to those 
gays and lesbians who conform to the model of the good heterosexual citizen. 
De Vos applauds Ackermann J’s judgment in National Coalition for Gay and 
Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1999 1 SA 6 (CC) as one which resists 
unified sexual categories and undermines heteronormative power. However, 
he is far more critical of Ackermann’s judgment in National Coalition for Gay 
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and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 2 SA 1 (CC), in which 
the word “spouse” is interpreted restrictively and protection for partners in 
a same-sex relationship is conditioned on the degree to which they conform 
to the model of heterosexual marriage. Jaco Barnard-Naudé (“Beyond the 
Brother: Radical Freedom”) similarly asks whether the refusal in the latter 
judgment to share out the word “spouse” is not an instance of a “fraternity” 
aimed at the preservation of likeness, as opposed to the recognition of radical 
difference.
A number of essays pay tribute to Judge Ackermann’s contribution to the 
development of a style of judicial reasoning that is suited to the interpretation 
of a transformative constitution pointing towards an ethical future. Catherine 
O’Regan (“From Form to Substance: The Constitutional Jurisprudence of 
Laurie Ackermann”) emphasises Judge Ackermann’s collegiality, diligence, 
modesty and anxiety that his intuitions about justice may be wrong. For 
her, one of his finest contributions lies in his knack for reasoning from 
fundamental normative principles, as opposed to reasoning from precedent 
or a style of judicial avoidance. Peggy Cooper-Davis (“Toward a Relational 
Constitutionalism”) notes that Ackermann J’s judgment in the first National 
Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality case, unlike the judgment of the 
United States Supreme Court in Lawrence v Texas 539 US 558 (2003), engages 
the voices, needs and concerns of members of the gay community.
Theunis Roux (“The Dignity of Comparative Constitutional Law”), in turn, 
focuses on Ackermann J’s contribution to comparative constitutional law and 
asks how his commitment to a comparative methodology ties in with his 
dignity jurisprudence. Noting that comparative constitutional law has played 
a relatively minor role in the development of the Court’s dignity jurisprudence 
and that it is Kant’s categorical imperative, as mediated through the Court’s 
understanding of the injustices of the past and the indigenous concept of 
ubuntu that has inspired and informed this jurisprudence, Roux nevertheless 
argues that these two aspects of Ackermann J’s legacy are closely related. 
Underlying Ackermann’s comparative endeavours is his belief that there are 
certain shared principles that can rise above the differences among open and 
democratic societies. In his view the inviolability of human dignity is clearly 
such a principle.
As I read through these essays I was reminded of a variety of issues that 
are not confronted head on in this volume, but that can benefit from the 
analyses contained therein. The tension between the Constitution’s ethical 
and aspirational dimensions and law’s compulsion with stability and order is 
one such issue. For example, does the critique of the judgment in the second 
National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality case indicate the limit of 
law’s capacity to respond to claims for the accommodation of difference? 
Can law only ever accommodate difference by reducing it to a variation 
of the same? How are we to disassociate dignity from dignified behaviour, 
democracy from vertical, statist processes and citizenship from the image of 
the ever so straight owner of a suburban home whose children attend a former 
model C school? And so on and so on.
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Another such issue relates to the rights of non-citizens. Our courts have, to 
invoke Du Bois’s distinction, delinked the basic moral dignity which accrues 
to every human being from the dignity of citizens. In cases like Khosa v 
Minister of Social Development; Mahlaule v Minister of Social Development 
2004 6 SA 505 (CC) and Minister of Home Affairs v Watchenuka 2004 4 SA 
326 (SCA) the right of certain categories of non-citizens not to be reduced to 
a life of degradation was recognised, even if they did not qualify for rights of 
full citizenship. And yet these judgments, by distinguishing between different 
categories of non-citizens, threaten to re-introduce into the idea of dignity 
the very notions of rank that are ruled out by the insistence that equal moral 
dignity vests in all human beings, regardless of their personal attributes or 
membership of a particular political community. The distinction and overlap 
between moral dignity and the dignity of citizens, and the critical importance 
of the need not to collapse humanity onto a bounded political community are 
issues in need of serious consideration.
Dignity, Freedom and the Post-Apartheid Legal Order is a fitting tribute 
to the ground-breaking work of Laurie Ackermann. It is the best collection 
of essays on dignity and freedom that I am aware of, either nationally or 
internationally, and it is certain to stimulate further debate. The conceptual 
vocabulary and theoretical insights developed on these pages, together with 
the intersections, dissonances and gaps between the various essays will 
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